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Introduction: the importance of participation 
 
Historically the concept of participation has been valued within western societies as they 
made the transition from agricultural to industrial based economies and the dangers of 
non-participation were highlighted (Durkheim 1893; Tonnies 1955[1881]; Park 1952; 
Marx 1959). Politicians and policymakers continue to be attracted for ideological and 
economic reasons. It is seen to generate social capital through which actors are able to 
secure benefits by virtue of membership in social networks or other structures (Bourdieu 
1986; Putnam 1993; Coleman 1990). Putnam also famously implies that civic 
participation leads to economic development; this lucrative connection appealing to 
financially constrained policymakers (Portes 1998). 
Participation therefore remains of central importance to modern social structures. 
The belief is that decentralisation and participation makes for better government as it 
brings government spatially closer to people and increases the availability and quality of 
information from citizens to government. And so it enables citizens to more actively 
participate in structures of governance achieving greater social and economic inclusion 
(Commins 2004). It also ‘adds a different and valuable dimension to local decision-
making processes’ (Stoker 2005:12) in that it gives individuals opportunities but also 
requires them to accept obligation (Blair 1994). This helps resolve tension between the 
state, market and community and it provides a ‘softer’ more people centred approach than 
is otherwise possible (Adams and Hess 2001:258). Different degrees of participation are 
evident, for instance local authorities aim to use their powers to enable rather than control 
(Taylor 2000). Indeed across Europe Callanan (2005) shows how a variety of different 
participative mechanisms is used by governments to facilitate participatory democracy.  
At the same time, the ‘mythologising’ (Hayward et al. 2004: 95) power of participation is 
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evident, for instance in the UK the New Labour government views public participation as 
achieving the following - improving the quality and legitimacy of public bodies decision 
making; addressing the democratic deficit; and building community capacity and social 
capital (Barnes et al. 2003). 
Using case studies from the USA and the UK, this chapter examines the efficacy of 
structures of governance. It does this by considering the way in which different actors 
participate in rural development within different ideological frameworks. The analysis 
pays particular attention to power relations within the process. The following section 
reviews agendas of participatory governance before presenting empirical evidence from 
the USA and the UK. Following public sector reform and ongoing restructuring of rural 
development policy and programmes, it scrutinises rural development activity within the 
state of Alabama before examining the European rural development framework that has 
emerged within Northern Ireland. Our analysis illustrates how processes of governance 
are interpreted differently across space. However, despite distinct administrative and 
political understanding of rural development, the research reveals that the opportunities 
for 'real' community participation, and the spaces that exist for meaningful engagement of 
'the community', are limited and indeed threatened by boundaries and elites that curtail 
possibilities for action. 
 
Agendas of participatory governance 
 
In recent years the proliferation of local partnerships between public and civil society 
sectors has indicated a global policy shift from government to governance (OECD 2001). 
Citizen participation is a central feature of these new arrangements. Arnstein (1969) 
famously encapsulated the nuances of participation, connecting citizen power to degrees 
of participation so that to achieve control citizens must have complete power. She points 
out that in situations where final approval, power and accountability lie with another 
agency then citizen control cannot be achieved.  Bearing in mind that ‘government in 
most states retain control over the key policy levers’ (Ayres and Pearce 2008:540), then it 
must be the case that in processes of governance, citizen control is not the primary 
objective. Governance embraces the notion of market rationality where states ‘stay at 
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arms-length from market forces, merely establishing and defending the framework for 
market institutions’ (Jessop 1999:2). Through systems of governance the state does not 
merely hand power over to the community, but it assumes an altered position so that 
‘power and interest are not simply rendered meaningless but are redefined and relocated’ 
(Hajer and Wagenaar 2003:5). The new position of the state is such that it works in 
partnership with different interest groups to assist local action on a range of issues 
(Warner 2001). This is evident in public sector modernisation and reform processes that 
are occurring at a global scale (OECD 2005). Much of the stimulus for these changes is 
to lessen the state and achieve greater efficiency and accountability while also ensuring 
citizen involvement at a local level (Pemberton and Woods 2010). 
Governance is thus characterised by the erosion of traditional boundaries, relying on 
new partners including the community, public and private sectors and based on devolved 
power (Rhodes 1997; Lowndes and Skelcher et al. 1996; Tendler 1997; Goodwin 1998; 
Murdoch and Abram 1998; Stoker 1998; Jones and Little 2000; Pierre 2000; Edwards et 
al. 2001; Pierre 2000; Gaventa 2004; and World Bank 2004). As state authority becomes 
redefined there is much more room for experimentation and diversity (Rhodes 2000). 
This is very much a potential or a possibility and as Jessop (1999) points out, success is 
not necessarily guaranteed. In other words creating these new structures does not ensure 
innovation or change, but it provides circumstances which encourage this very approach. 
This differs according to local contexts. For instance, in the US policy principles derived 
from market logics such as efficiency and autonomy are prized (Warner 2007). Equalities 
of opportunity are valued; equalities of outcome (for example, social inclusion) less so 
(Alesina and Glaeser 2004). Reshaped governance structures in the US fit encourage 
rather than mandate citizen participation in most local development programs.  
Conversely in Europe different political values are evident with the implementation of 
mainstreaming measures to ensure public bodies achieve a desirable level of participation 
in all of their activities (see for example Section 75 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998) 
alongside compulsory measures within specific programmes such as the European Rural 
Development Programme (CEC 2005). Much of the stimulus for participatory 
governance across Europe is to lessen the state and achieve greater efficiency and 
accountability while simultaneously ensuring citizen involvement at a local level 
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(Pemberton and Woods 2010 online early JRS). Thus devolution in the US has had a 
somewhat different valence than that in Europe. 
The combination of decentralisation and the reformation of political structures have 
thus resulted in participatory programmes assuming a central position in these regions as 
well as many other western economies (see for example, Furmankiewicz et al. 2010; 
Miraftab and McConnell 2008; Harwood and Zapata 2006; and Raco et al. 2006; Radin et 
al. 1996). The emerging framework has necessitated a paradigm shift from a top-down 
model of development to one which relies on a bottom-up, integrative approach. It relies 
on local assets and knowledge and has also placed pressure on tradition hierarchical 
administrative structures (OECD 2005). The literature would suggest that the capacity for 
communities to exercise genuine power is limited (Cooke and Kothari 2001; Hickey and 
Mohan 2004) and asymmetric power relations prevail (Skelcher et al. 1996; Campbell 
and Marshall 2000; Muir 2004 and Somerville 2005). The challenge of achieving 
participation appears to remain as governments across the globe embrace the principles of 
governance, each within localised contexts and raising questions of efficiency, 
effectiveness and equality. The rural development arena provides an example of a space 
where these new interactions between the state and partners from outside government are 
executed. 
The literature suggests that governance structures are not always adequate for 
addressing local issues for a number of reasons. Perpetual questions have been raised in 
relation to the effectiveness of governance structures including the legitimacy of 
partnerships and of partners; power relations among partners; capacity building and pre-
development; weak consultation processes; participation; incoherence between layers of 
governance; lack of strategic direction and unrealistic time pressures (see for instance 
Shortall and Shucksmith 2001; Hayward et al. 2004; Scott 2004; Shortall 2005; Goodwin 
2006; Connelly et al. 2006; Miraftab and McConnell 2008; Derkzen and Bock 2009; 
McAreavey 2009b; Furmankiewicz et al. 2010).  Particularly in places where an uneven 
distribution of power has been durable, local governance may be less participatory, either 
formally or in practice (Dewees et al. 2003). Its mechanisms may replicate traditional 
power relationships or exacerbate them due to the retreat of unifying directives from the 
central state (Peterson 1981). Power according to Lukes relies on the capacity and the 
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legitimacy to call on the obedience of others; it is about being able to influence the 
thoughts and desires of its objects without their being aware of its effects, so their real 
interests are suppressed. This goes beyond the second face of power identified by 
Bachrach and Baratz (1962) which encompasses overt and covert exclusion such as 
outright exclusion of particular groups or through control or manipulation of the agenda. 
So although individuals may have the capacity to exercise power; they may choose not to 
do so (Barnes 1988; Scott 2001; and Lukes 2005). In other words actors have options and 
choices that they are free to make in the pursuit of their particular interests. If it is the 
case that ‘a community understands its own problems through frameworks that are in fact 
inadequate to address its own goals’ (Ron 2008:4) then difficulties are likely to persist in 
relation to the ability of partners to participate in a meaningful way in rural development 
actions.   
 
Participating in rural development 
 
In the Future of Rural Society, the European Commission outlined its fundamental 
approach to rural development (CEC 1988). This was significant, not least because it 
paved the way for a major reform of the CAP and highlighting the need for restructuring 
of agriculture alongside protecting the environment. Furthermore it indicated a new social 
agenda and the political direction for Europe as it placed emphasis on achieving social 
and economic cohesion. This marked a major transition in agricultural policy, shifting 
from a sectoral to a territorial basis, placing emphasis on economic diversification while 
also encouraging integrated, endogenous rural development. 
Not long after publication of its seminal policy, the LEADER initiative was 
introduced by the Commission in 1991 as a major community initiative aimed 
specifically at rural development. It represented not only a commitment to rural (as 
opposed to agricultural) development but a very new policy style.  LEADER included the 
unique combination of small, local groups; innovative development projects and flexible 
funding (Ray 1998). The policy rhetoric was one of empowerment, participation, 
community, capacity building, partnership, innovation and finally knowledge/ experience 
transfer as the initiative was considered a rural laboratory (Sivenas 2006). It allowed a 
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territory to cultivate its own ‘development repertoire’ paying attention to the specificity 
of that area including food, craft, language and dialect, landscape and music’ (Ray 
1999:525). Despite policy rhetoric of community capacity building and involvement the 
LEADER approach has provoked broader questions concerning the governance approach 
including the legitimacy of local partnerships; representation; economic versus social 
objectives and power relations (see for example Storey 1999; Ray 2000; Shortall and 
Shucksmith 2001; Scott 2002, 2004). 
Past problems notwithstanding, it is significant that the LEADER approach has 
been mainstreamed under this European Agriculture Rural Development Fund. The 
priority on a social welfare agenda therefore remains in these most recent reforms of the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), Agenda 2000. Pillar One of the CAP is concerned 
with agricultural market support and direct payments, namely the Single Payment 
Scheme (CEC 2005). Pillar Two refers to expenditure under the new Rural Development 
Regulation (RDR) and is aimed at improving the competitiveness of agriculture and 
forestry while achieving environmentally sustainable land management and also 
diversifying rural economic activity (Council Regulation (EU) No. 1698/2005). The 
majority of agricultural subsidies are now decoupled from the level of production (single 
farm payment) and linked to good agricultural and environmental practice (cross-
compliance).  In addition, direct farm payments will be reduced over time (modulation) 
with monies redirected to finance rural development (CEC 2005). CAP is therefore no 
longer an agricultural policy; to the contrary rural development has increased in 
prominence and importance (Petit 2008). Indeed opportunities exist for non-farmers to 
access these funds, including non-profit organizations and rural businesses. 
In the US, most rural development policy and funding is managed through the 
Department of Agriculture; USDA Rural Development programs help with low interest 
loans and grants for housing, water and wastewater systems, community facilities, energy 
projects, and business development   (USDA, 2009). Nonprofit organizations, rural 
businesses, and public bodies—or their partnership groups—generally apply for direct 
loans or grants, which state offices award through the Rural Empowerment Program, the 
Rural Economic Area Partnership, and the National Rural Development Partnership.  
These governance mechanisms within the US have frequently helped create vibrant 
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growth poles that incorporate significant citizen participation in planning. For example, 
through the successful federally-funded Resource Development and Conservation 
Program (RDCP), state rural development councils are encouraged to reflect membership 
from five partnership groups: federal officials, state officials, local government, tribal 
representatives, and the private sector (Radin et al. 1996). Other forms of development 
funding provided by the federal government (such as Community Development Block 
Grants) require states to create space for public input on locally-implemented projects. 
These participatory efforts can reshape the economic terrain of broad regions; a good 
example is the state of Vermont which has been transformed from an agricultural 
backwater to a center of the booming local agriculture movement through the work of 
public-private partnerships like the Vermont Council on Rural Development (Radin 
2001).    
Evidence also shows that these bright spots have been unevenly distributed 
throughout rural space and the citizen “empowerment” envisioned in the shift to 
devolution has not been uniformly attainable.  This is in part because most of the funding 
flowing to rural communities comes from USDA in the form of commodity-related 
subsidies and conservation payments for producers (Whitener and Parker 2007).  The 
focus on commodity support means that, unlike Europe, rural development policy in the 
US lacks a “multi-functional link that effectively connects it to broader rural development 
and environmental objectives” (Warner and Shortall 2008: 1). Thus despite growing 
goals of participation, economic interests like growth coalitions and producer lobbies, 
may continue to dominate rural governance (ibid.).  This may be especially true in high 
poverty areas with low levels of human capital and unequal access to power and 
resources perhaps because social inclusion and economic equity are not stated policy 
goals as in the EU.  Even where participation is strongly encouraged as with the RDCP, 
there is much state level variation with some councils extending membership to any 
interested elected officials and others presenting considerable barriers to heterogenous 
participation (Radin et al. 1996). With the increased focus since the 1980s on block 
grants to states (such as the Empowerment Zones/Enterprise Communities program, 
which makes grants for tax credits and other supply-side incentives for business 
investment (Reid 1999)), the growth of a competitive development ideology within local 
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government has further deemphasized equity as a central consideration (Donahue 1997).   
Without structured mechanisms in place in the US, opportunities for participation, 
ostensibly provided through devolution, may be less available in practice. Decreased 
regulation and directive from the central state can leave a power vacuum easily filled by 
traditionally dominant group. This in turn can exacerbate existing imbalances: 
communities with resource inequalities may defer to elites to plan and carry out policies 
that would bring much needed investment quickly, which at the sub-national level 
typically requires maximizing capital inflow and minimizing redistribution (Peterson 
1981; Gunderson et al. 2004). Even in a European context of equality and inclusion, there 
is evidence of dominance of elite interests with the state agenda permeating regeneration 
initiatives, often without attention given to wider community interests (Cornwall 2004; 
Williams 2004; Taylor 2007; McAreavey 2009a, 2009b). 
And so questions remains: in what exactly are the partners of rural governance 
participating? How much power are they afforded? To what extent are they able to 
exercise change within structures of governance? Are some types of participation more 
appropriate than others? How do the different contexts impact on power relations among 
rural development actors? 
 
The USA context: Alabama 
 
The southern US has a history of spatial inequality and most of the country’s persistent 
poverty counties are located here (Kusmin 2008). The southern states were some of the 
strongest advocates for devolution during the Reagan Era, with a long history of demand 
for states’ rights and the relaxation of mandates tied to federal aid (Sanders 1999); 
political culture tends to be traditionalistic-individualistic (emphasizing traditional 
authority and protection of private interests) (Elazar 1994).  Alabama is in many ways an 
ideal-typical state for this region.  Its government is particularly small: it consistently 
ranks in the bottom 5 US states in terms of per-capita taxation. Human capital is also 
quite low: the state also consistently ranks in the bottom 5 or so for per-pupil 
expenditures, median household income, and bachelor’s degree attainment (US Census 
2008). 
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The state’s economic development agenda has long been dominated by a small-
government framework focusing on capital subsidy primarily through low tax rates and 
low labor costs (Rork 2005).  With the increasing entrepreneurialism enabled by new 
governance processes, innovative multi-level partnerships between state government and 
transnational companies were formed during the 1990s and helped generate a number of 
new urban and suburban jobs particularly through recruitment of foreign auto 
manufacturers.  The AlabamaGermany Partnership, for example, facilitated valuable 
relationships between German firms, state officials, and local workforces.  Other 
partnerships, such as the Economic Development Partnership of Alabama, provided a 
space for support businesses (such as technical support or warehousing), state workforce 
training programs, and employers to interact. These new governance structures had 
dynamic results for many local economies and were key in establishing a level of 
endogenous development within a state that had long grappled with a stagnant industrial 
profile.   
However, in the late 90s and early 00s, the state faced a number of budget crises as 
well as troubling economic trends like the overseas exodus of traditional industries and 
the accelerating competitiveness of workforces in neighboring states like Florida and 
Georgia. While wealthier suburban locales were benefiting from new partnerships and 
investments, other institutional structures with deep historical roots prevented these 
economic flows from benefiting the state as a whole. In particular, the state constitution 
(created by landowning elites in the post-Civil War era) codified anti-regulationist 
principles that made Alabama an attractive location for foreign manufacturing firms, but 
it also lacked basic mechanisms that would ameliorate the inevitable social contradictions 
of growth. An extremely regressive system of taxation (weighted heavily on the sales 
tax), a lack of county home rule, and a highly earmarked budget are the key elements of 
this institutional structure (Permaloff and Grafton 2008).  The tax arrangement meant that 
revenues from wealthy areas would not be shared with poor (often rural and black) local 
schools and governments. The lack of county home rule meant that legislative 
“gatekeepers” would determine what local policy goals were accomplished. And, the 
earmarked budget (about 87% of revenue) meant that new social demands would not find 
support or accommodation. As a result, historically disadvantaged areas continued to 
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slide relatively further backward in terms of publicly-funded human development factors 
such as educational attainment.  Poor schools, few amenities, and inferior jobs 
opportunities (especially in the “Black Belt,” twelve contiguous counties with majority 
African American populations) contributed to a persistent cycle of rural 
underemployment and low endogenous development capacity.   
This key aspect of the state’s institutional structure was durable for a number of 
reasons. It maintained long-standing power relationships even in times of economic 
prosperity, when capital influxes should have been converted to more stable economic 
bases such as human capital investment (Rork 2005). It also reproduced perceptions of 
the proper distribution of power between state, market, and community: for maximum 
civic freedom, the state should be tightly bounded and free market processes privileged (a 
key neoliberal tenet, Peck and Tickell 2002).  As a result, collective ideologies 
emphasized trust in market elites and mistrust in or resignation toward the existing 
governance structure, all of which further stymied citizen empowerment.  Economic 
elites also had an instrumental role in maintaining these conditions; it was widely 
acknowledged that certain groups—particularly powerful rural interests like large 
agricultural and timber landowners and their lobbies—systematically influenced the 
policy behavior of local legislators and voters both directly and indirectly.   
During the late 1990s and 2000s the state government became concerned by these 
issues of spatial inequality and the minimal opportunities and capacities available in 
much of rural Alabama and considered a number of modernizing reforms to address 
spatial inequality through education investments and a moderately progressive reshuffling 
of the tax code.  However, given the conservative partisan and ideological commitments 
of these leaders, increasing capacities in lagging areas was not seen as an emancipatory 
end in itself, but was seen exclusively as a means to create or attract economic growth.  A 
more educated rural workforce would make these areas more appealing to employers and 
might ideally make them net contributors to rather than net drains on state resources.  
Proposed reforms to existing governance structures aimed to break up some of these 
entrenched relationships of power and influence because their macroeconomic effects had 
finally become apparent to state government.   
However, even in their ambitiousness, the programs which the state proposed in an 
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attempt to ameliorate unevenness still hewed to very similar power frameworks.  These 
were “hard” reforms administered from the state level in a top-down manner; few aspects 
of these development policy proposals would have actually brought participatory agency 
down to the level of local communities or enabled endogenous development as 
understood through current scholarly consensus: “valorizing and exploiting local 
resources…and [emphasizing] local participation in the design and implementation of 
action…therefore implying radical changes in the mode of governing” (Furmankiewicz et 
al. 2010: 53).  This may be because the institutional and cultural context that maintains an 
uneven distribution of resources over the Alabama landscape (as discussed above) also 
sets up significant obstacles to bottom-up development.  With an inflexible budget and 
low tax revenues, public infrastructural investments such as broadband access and public 
transportation are lacking, which prevents local people from pursuing available education 
and training opportunities and from establishing or nurturing valuable social and 
economic networks outside of their immediate communities.  Human capitals are often 
low due to poor local education opportunities and few skilled in-migrants, meaning a 
dearth of many of the civic and entrepreneurial capacities important to endogenous 
development efforts.  None of the targeted policies that researchers have identified as key 
to facilitating endogenous development (Radin et al. 1996)—promoting local government 
cooperation, allowing jurisdictions to share locally generated tax revenues, promoting 
local land-use planning, establishing training for civic leaders—were proposed during 
this period.  Research by Dewees et al. (2003) in the state of Ohio suggests that these 
circumstances are part of a broader pattern whereby US counties most disadvantaged by 
changing macroeconomic conditions tend not to be able to make use of the community-
led development opportunities that new governance structures were supposed to facilitate.   
The local dependence fostered by Alabama’s governance structure and its dominant 
capital-subsidy paradigm has prevented communities from even conceptualizing 
development as a bottom-up process.  The rhetoric of “job deliverance” has dominated 
speech from public officials for decades, and the publicity afforded successful industrial 
recruitments saturates the media.  Subsidies for exogenous employers (tax abatements, 
workforce training, site preparation, etc.)—even smaller ones—are not matched by 
subsidies for home-grown employers.  State disbursements of federal development 
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funding appear to favor capital investments over community projects (for example, 71% 
of the 2009 block grants disbursed to Alabama counties, towns, and cities went to sewer, 
streets, and drainage projects; only 22% went to establishment or revitalization of 
community resources like senior centers, parks, or libraries (ADECA 2009)).  Rather than 
an isolated incident, this data may corroborate previous evidence on state tendencies to 
assist local governments rather than community organizations, which were the intended 
beneficiaries in some of the programs being replaced by block grants; in such cases, 
“underserved constituents were often missing or under-represented on boards overseeing 
how funds were used locally” (Reeder 1996:3).  
Because the logics of endogenous development are framed in top-down terms and 
through market rationality themes like “economies of scale,” the ideas of creating jobs 
through local enterprise, or of building community capacities that are not connected to 
immediate economic benefits, are less familiar and possibly seen as inefficient, not only 
by state and market elites, but also—judging from the widespread lack of demand for 
enabling governance structures—by local communities themselves.   Despite popular 
rhetorics of market rationality, equality of opportunity, and self-reliance, these 
circumstances continue to justify continued perceptions of public investment in 
disadvantaged areas as a “waste.”  Currently, most of the top-down reforms that were 
proposed to break up stagnant relationships of economic inequality have been defeated in 
referenda through aggressive campaigns by elite opponents such as the agriculture lobby.  
Without any parallel state attempts to build endogenous development capacities, many 
rural communities appear to be in much the same place as they were twenty years ago 
despite the success of partnerships and new governance mechanisms in the capital 
subsidy sphere of development. 
 
The European context: Northern Ireland 
 
Many rural development partnerships exist within Northern Ireland reflecting a multi-
scalar governance approach. Some, such as the European INTERREG programme 
promoting territorial co-operation across border regions, are found across Member States. 
Others are distinctive to Northern Ireland and reflect circumstances particular to that 
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region. For example under new legislation emerging from the Good Friday Agreement 
(North/South Co-operation (Implementation Bodies) (Northern Ireland) Order 1999), six 
cross-border non-departmental public bodies were established ‘to implement policies 
agreed by Ministers in the North/South Ministerial Council and to develop cross-border 
co-operation on practical matters of mutual concern’. Meanwhile the Special European 
Union Programme Body was created to administer EU funded programmes, including the 
European Programme for Peace and Reconciliation (i.e. the PEACE programme). 
PEACE funding is typically awarded to larger public bodies who, as intermediary agents, 
distribute the monies to smaller community and voluntary sector based organisations. 
PEACE is not a rural development programme per se, but because it specifically includes 
the border region with the Irish Republic, geography means that it corresponds to some of 
the most rural areas of Northern Ireland. Meanwhile the International Fund for Ireland 
(IFI) is funded by the USA, the European Union, Canada, Australia and New Zealand 
and, like the PEACE programme, operates in Northern Ireland and the border counties of 
Ireland. Its objective is also to encourage peace and reconciliation through economic and 
social development. Both PEACE and the IFI represent funding sources for rural 
development activities that complement Europe’s mainstream fund that exists within the 
current Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The success of each of these initiatives is 
reliant on the participation of local communities and the CAP provides an example of 
how participation is a limited affair. 
Although operating within a common rural development policy, each member state 
retains considerable control.  For example, each state is obliged to draw up a seven-year 
rural development plan at a geographic level that it deems appropriate. Activities are 
drawn from a list of thirteen set out in Article 33 of the Rural Development Regulation 
and include traditional agricultural actions as well as broader rural development measures 
including development of villages; protection and conservation of the rural heritage;  and 
farm relief services. This provides a framework for the allocation of funds, sourced from 
the EU and matched by the member state. The implementation of these national rural 
development plans, such as the Northern Ireland Rural Development Programme 
(NIRDP), is reliant on Local Action Groups that adopt the LEADER approach ‘including 
partnership capacity, implementation of local strategies, cooperation, networking and 
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acquisition of skills’ (CEC, 2005:6(50)). These partnerships devise area based strategies 
from which individual projects are funded and comprise representatives from the 
voluntary and community; public; and private sectors. The programme very neatly 
epitomizes the governance approach that is evident globally within the new rural 
paradigm (OECD 2006).  
From an EU budgetary perspective RDR funding is approximately 10 percent of the 
CAP budget but there is potential to increase this through modulation. Modulation refers 
to the ability of member states to use money saved on direct agricultural subsidies (Pillar 
One) to be transferred to rural development and environmental schemes (Pillar Two) 
(CEC, 1998). Compulsory modulation has been applied across the EU since 2005, set 
initially at four percent and increased to five percent from 2007. The UK and Portugal 
also secured EU agreement for an additional voluntary national modulation rate (Lowe et 
al., 2002), up to a rate of 20 percent, to be applied. In England this will see the overall 
modulation rate (EU and additional national rate) rise to 19 percent from 2009. This has 
been deemed necessary to fund national agri-environmental schemes including the new 
Entry Level Stewardship. However, the rules for additional voluntary modulation allow 
each devolved region within the UK to set rates according to their own rural development 
needs and priorities. This sees the Northern Ireland overall modulation rate rise to 12 
percent in 2009 (compared to 9.2 percent in Wales and 13.5 percent in Scotland) (Defra 
website accessed 31/ 10/ 2008). However, it could be argued that by capping voluntary 
modulation below (at 4.5 percent in the past and currently at a maximum rate of 14 
percent for England) the 20 percent rate permitted by the EU (House of Commons, 2002) 
the UK (including its devolved regions) are offering a hollow nod in the direction of 
reform lobbyists. Significant also, national modulation is driven by a need to fund agri-
environmental schemes.  For example, up to 80 percent of voluntary modulation will be 
allocated to thematic axis 2 (improving the environment and the countryside).  Over the 
seven years of the Rural Development Programme voluntary modulation is earmarked for 
funding of £180 million by the Northern Ireland Assembly (Farmers Journal, 2007). 
Simultaneously the Review of Public Administration in Northern Ireland aims to 
strengthen the role of local government so that ‘under the new system councils will have 
responsibility for a wide range of functions and a strong power to influence a great many 
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more. This will enable them to respond flexibly to local needs and make a real difference 
to people’s lives … and through community planning the opportunity exists to promote 
good relations, address poverty and environmental issues, and develop normal civic 
society’ (NI Executive 2006:8). The Review of Public Administration is essentially about 
aligning administrative boundaries so that public services can be delivered more 
effectively. Meanwhile participatory governance is embedded within the new councils. 
Part of their enhanced functions includes responsibility for rural development; urban and 
rural regeneration; and community planning. This latter role ‘will require the council to 
consult all its constituents about issues that affect their lives and allow people to have a 
say in the way in which their area is developed...Councils will not necessarily directly 
deliver all the services for which they are responsible. They will be encouraged to 
develop partnership arrangements with the voluntary and community sectors, and the 
private sector in developing and commissioning services’ (Northern Ireland Executive 
2006:7). 
This emerging structure is being super-imposed on an already cluttered rural 
development space. 
The Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (DARD) as the central 
government body co-ordinating the rural development programme in the region, 
originally intended that the boundaries of the LAGs would be ‘co-terminus’ with the new 
councils. However the new Northern Ireland administrative (council) boundaries have not 
yet been implemented due to the ongoing implementation of the Review of Public 
Administration (NI Executive 2008). Hence the creation of seven LAGs has been made 
more complicated as existing councils have come together to form clusters. The example 
of the North East area illustrates the different stages of this process. The newly formed 
LAG has 30 members of which 15 are from statutory and government bodies and 15 
represent social and community organisations. The council cluster (in this case five: 
Ballymena, Ballymoney, Coleraine, Larne and Moyle) nominated elected representatives 
to the LAG. Individuals were able to apply to this North East area council cluster for a 
place as a social partner using application forms (designated by DARD). Following the 
scoring of each application using criteria devised by the council cluster with guidance 
from DARD, an open meeting was then held to seek agreement on the 15 social and 
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community partners. Individuals were scored, and therefore their suitability assessed, on 
a number of issues including skills and experience in financial appraisal, economic 
development, programme delivery and business planning (DARD 2007).  In theory an 
area could have had more than one LAG competing to deliver the programme. In addition 
the council clusters were required by DARD to have clear scoring criteria and to actively 
promote equality of opportunity for all interest groups (in line with Section 75 of the 
Northern Ireland Act 1998). DARD subsequently approved a LAG for each area. In 
partnership with the council cluster, the approved LAG is responsible for developing and 
implementing a local rural development strategy that addresses the measures outlined 
within Axis three of the NIRDP 2007-13. This will complement the NI wide programme.  
Publicity material asserts that the council cluster is financially and administratively 
responsible for the funds and for the operation of the local LAG, but significantly the 
contract for local programme implementation and delivery is between DARD and a lead 
council that has been agreed by the cluster (DARD 2007). Meanwhile funding is paid 
directly from DARD to the relevant project; the council clusters are not involved. 
Broadly then, the LAGs role is to assist with animation of the area, and to co-operate 
with, and make recommendations to, the council cluster. It has neither legal nor financial 
responsibilities. Meanwhile a single council is legally responsible for delivering the 
programme. 
 
Discussion 
 
These case studies suggest that institutional frameworks for rural development can hinder 
community empowerment even where central state authority is tightly bounded and 
devolved governance mechanisms have taken hold.  In both cases, “state projects and 
strategies rest on a prior… identification of suitable objects of intervention and activity” 
to describe the social, political and cultural characteristics of a created space (Pemberton 
and Woods 2010:5), that is the rural development arena. These are not necessarily 
‘popular spaces’ that emerge from within and are defined by the community; they are 
instead ‘invited spaces’ that are conceptualized by the state and into which communities 
are invited (Cornwall, 2004). But this is only part of the story: Foucault (1982) argues 
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that power operates through social systems rather than at a personal level with individual 
practices suggested by culture, society and social group. Power relations within rural 
governance are complex and uneven. Actors have agency, they are not entirely impassive 
recipients of state action; they have particular experiences, interests and beliefs, all of 
which affect how and where they choose to act (Hay 2002; Bevir and Rhodes 2006).  
LAG members within NIRDP have the capacity to exercise power firstly through 
the act of participation as this ensures that DARD complies with European program 
requirements.  There is the prospect for LAG members to exert further power, albeit 
within the bounds of the rural development framework, as they are responsible for 
stimulating local development and also for making recommendations to the council 
clusters. However, these individuals are not able to alter the boundaries of action and 
thereby affect change through this channel. Furthermore the field of what is possible is 
ultimately determined by central government and by the European Commission, and to a 
lesser extent by the local council cluster. Although individuals were able to become 
involved in the LAG (subject to meeting certain criteria), they were not able to participate 
in the restricted decision making realm that existed across the different levels of 
governance such as within the council cluster. Decisions were confined to specific, pre-
defined issues; ‘real’ interests were not necessarily identified. In this sense hidden power 
was evident as those outside control were not only omitted from the political process but 
they were denied entry (Lukes, 2005). 
In the US case, the efficiency imperative more overtly shaped rural development 
agendas and “processes” appear collectively deemed less important than “product.”  
Attempts to increase rural development capacities were envisioned and imposed in a top-
down manner, suggesting that traditionally disadvantaged communities continued to be 
objects rather than subjects of development.  To paraphrase Lagendijk, as it is the state’s 
‘imaginaries’ of rural space that define the subjects and objects of development, it also 
shapes the strategies and actions that emerge (2007:1199); displaying the ideology and 
dominance of the elite (Mills 1956). In other words the way in which the state 
understands development affects the ultimate outcomes. If, as in the case of Alabama, the 
product is imperative then at the very most, lip service is paid to process issues. Though 
devolution aims to bring government closer to citizens, state structures like the state 
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constitution maintain certain distributions of power.  Low expectations around local 
communities’ ability to produce effective economic outcomes legitimate these 
distributions of power.   
Furmankiewicz et al. (2010) observe a similar pattern in rural Poland whereby local 
enterprises, perceived by officials as incapable, were “supported” by organizational 
guidelines that actually constrained their endogenous development efforts.  As in 
Northern Ireland and in Alabama, elite-defined norms and agendas are continually 
maintained.  So while the NIRDP has the indicators of an exogenous and integrated 
approach, there is a danger that old criticisms of emphasis on product over process will 
re-emerge. Already much emphasis has been placed on establishing the correct 
framework for ensuring financial and operational rigor. For example the Farm Family 
Options measure within the NIRDP did not open until November 2009 due to delays with 
DARDs approval of the Economic Appraisal and Audit Queries (personal communication 
with staff).  The framework within which regeneration initiatives actually operate in both 
cases examined in this chapter would appear to be allied to systems of managerial control 
or established authority rather than to processes of community empowerment (Raco and 
Imrie 2000). Statutory agencies retain power over individual rural development actors as 
they set out and implement the terms of engagement, supporting the opinion that the rules 
of engagement rest firmly with the elite (Bochel 2006). The programs exhibit further 
elitism as the power of the ruling class is reinforced through recreation of their structures, 
norms and process. In other words there was little debate around how rural development 
programs are to be delivered. The very means by which interaction occurs is shaped by 
statutory agencies, oftentimes with other partners of governance oblivious to this 
manipulation and control. The inherent assumption of organisational superiority is a 
symptom of the privileged ruling stratum; it is part of the ideology of the elite (Mills 
1956; Katz 1975). It follows that this elite shapes the very nature of ensuing action and 
creates a privileged regeneration community (McAreavey 2009a). 
These critical explorations of the extent to which participation is actually achievable 
given varying governance structures are important because rural local governments in 
both regions have been tasked with considerable responsibility for regeneration (HM 
Treasury 2007, Reese 1994; OECD 2006; CEC 2005). If local people and knowledges are 
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to be formally valued as much as higher-level economic forces (such as macroeconomic 
policies coming from the central state) the continued operation of traditional and/or 
hidden power relationships should be acknowledged. Because the state itself “has no 
power—it is merely an institutional ensemble” that “reflects the prevailing balance of 
forces” (Jessop 1990 as quoted in Pemberton and Goodwin 2010: 3), limiting the state 
does not necessarily change the balance of economic or social forces; interventions in the 
third dimension of power where agendas are set and processes of inequality normalized 
(Lukes 2005), would be appropriate but ambitious.  Otherwise full participation in the 
sense that Arnstein describes will remain an elite privilege—not only through boundaries 
to access but through dominant discourses that limit communities’ understanding of their 
agency.  This arrangement limits capacities to bring about change but also, in the 
Foucauldian sense, to shape what is possible.   
But as Derkzen et al. (2008) remind us, asymmetrical power relations are perhaps 
less of a problem than we might think. Is it appropriate for individuals or groups without 
professional experience in development work to be granted responsibility for skilled tasks 
such as financial monitoring and budget prioritizing? Do communities want these 
responsibilities where “product”—rural regeneration—is an economic need of the first 
order?  Equally, questions must be asked about the ability of statutory agencies to 
effectively identify and engage with interested parties within a particular territory. At the 
end of the day much of the imperative for participatory governance is to achieve greater 
efficiency and effectiveness; ultimately rural development actors do not aspire to 
realizing seismic power shifts. Mass participation is unlikely to deliver greater efficacy; 
instead strategic participation would be inclined to have more relevance. At the least, 
greater reflexivity by policymakers and multi-level partners might help keep the positive 
rhetoric of participation grounded in the complex reality of its application. The challenge 
remains for players in this new rural paradigm: how to transcend artificiality, secure 
meaningful engagement while creating space for the articulation and implementation of a 
community agenda? 
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